3 : The Sinews Of War Are Infinite Money
The emerging notion that information may have become the currency of modern war may be true as intelligence sources expand, and data is qualitatively being compared to oil. Information value and availability moves capital (money), and capital reflexively generates more information in turn. This interaction does not mean that they are the same thing, however. Intelligence (as information) can buy lives and time on the battlefield, but capital still buys the war and the tools that aid the intelligence process. Information is the carrier frequency capital rides to obtain something of value.
3 : The Sinews of War Are Infinite Money
But the anime chooses to juxtapose its tension with rather absurd elements. Although it's initially jarring and does pull viewers out of the scene briefly, surprisingly, it ends up working well. Given the premise of a detective who has an unlimited supply of money, the anime is set up to be more tongue-in-cheek than anything but this episode not only highlights this all the more prominently, it also demonstrates its strength in balancing heart and humor.
When you build a show around a detective who has an unlimited supply of money, realism doesn't have much of a place. Millionaire Detective could have gone for an overly outrageous approach but it chose to balance heart and laughter instead. To do this, Millionaire Detective uses two different mediums, juxtaposing these two seemingly disparate elements of tension and absurdity. One is through the soundtrack. The James Bond/Pink Panther style is both catchy but silly in its blaring bombast.
You expect one thing and you get something else, and you're constantly kept on your toes because of it. It makes it much more enjoyable to watch. The narrative style of Millionaire Detective could be symbolic of its detective duo: Daisuke is the more serious type but the way he goes about things and his casualness in using his money makes it so unrealistic and ridiculous, you can't help but laugh. While Haru is the more hardworking, serious type but even his reactions veer on the comedic side. It's a combination that ultimately pays off emotionally.
KR: Is there a general rule that states should raise as much money as humanly possible; that states should not only max out the credit card, but get as many credit cards as possible and max them all out?
RCZ: First of all, I think all US citizens should be doing this: there has to be democratic accountability, and all citizens should be at least somewhat conversant in war finance, to understand where their money is going and what the effects are. Historians and economists who write about this bear a unique responsibility to communicate this information to the public. Sadly, I think economic historians are a dying subset of economics. But more broadly, everyone has something to learn and contribute to these conversations. These more abstract questions of value, money, and meaning can all help us understand why our societies pursue the policies that they do. The social sciences at large can learn a lot from this.
In the EU, the guidelines for decarbonisation are currently being laid down as part of the European Green Deal. In November, EU member states had agreed not to inject any more money into fossil fuel projects via the European Investment Bank in the future.
The first-ever building block, the 1952 Coal and Steel Community, was a bid by a war-shattered Continent to put those sinews of war under supranational control. Subsequent steps to create a customs union, then a single market, and now a common currency, have all headed in the same direction: a "united states" of Europe.
The true method of decyphering, as it were, the complicated operations of statesmen with respect to this branch of politics, is to bring back to their native simplicity such plans of administration, as, from the infinite perplexity of them, make people believe, that the principles which influence this district of the science lie so involved, as to require a peculiar force of genius even to comprehend them.
By proceeding in this plain track, and by keeping principles constantly in view, the most perplexed systems of borrowing, funding, stock-jobbing, coining and re-coining of money, changing the weight, fineness, and denominations of specie, circulating paper in conjunction with it, imposing upon mankind with bubbles and bankruptcies, and calling them operations of public credit, may be rendered intelligible to the most slender capacity.
Public credit we have defined to be, the confidence reposed in a state, or body politic, borrowing money, on condition that the capital shall not be demandable, but that a certain proportional part of the sum shall be annually paid, either in lieu of interest, or in extinction of part of the capital; for the security of which payment, a permanent annual fund is appropriated, with a liberty, however, to the state to free itself, by repaying the whole, when nothing to the contrary is stipulated.
In this definition I have put in an alternative, of paying a perpetual interest for the money borrowed, or of paying annually a sum exceeding the interest; which excess is intended to extinguish the capital in a certain number of years. In both cases, the annual payment is called an annuity. When it is exactly equal to the interest agreed on, it is called perpetual; and determinate, when it is granted either for life, or for a certain number of years.
When a statesman, therefore, establishes a system of public credit, the first object which should fix his attention is to calculate how far the constitution of the state, and its internal circumstances, render it expedient to throw the revenue of it into the hands of a moneyed interest. I say, this is the most important object of his deliberation; because the solidity of his credit depends upon it.
If, all the interests of the state duly considered, that of trade be found to predominate; less inconvenience will be found in allowing the moneyed interest to swell: but in monarchies, where the landed interest is commonly, and ought to be the most powerful, it would be dangerous to erect so formidable a rival to it. In political bodies every separate interest will consult its own; and in the contest between those who will be made to pay, and those who are to receive the taxes, under the denomination of creditors, the security of public credit will become precarious.
From this we may conclude, First, That in governments where the swelling of a moneyed interest is found to threaten the tranquillity of the state, care should be taken either to establish a sinking fund, for paying off, in times of peace, what may have been borrowed in times of war, or the plan of borrowing upon determinate annuities must be established.
During this period, the coin and precious metals of Europe were in a great measure, lodged, in private coffers. If wars brought them forth for a short time, they soon found their way back again. Princes were generally poor; because they were generally extravagant, and spent money as fast as they got it. In proportion as industry and alienation increased, the coin came abroad; the inhabitants became easy in their circumstances; the state flourished, and acquired reputation. The riches and power of a state began then to be estimated, as they ought to be, not by their treasures locked up, but by what was found in circulation; that is, by their industry. Venice, Genoa, and the Hanstowns, set the example. The Jews, banished from France, on account of their extortions in the time of the holy wars, fled, as it is said, into Lombardy, and there invented the use of bills of exchange, for drawing their riches from those countries to which they durst not resort in order to bring them off. Interest for money began to be considered as lawful in many cases: merchants were protected by Princes, for the sake of the consequences of trade and industry: and from such small beginnings has this mighty engine of public credit sprung.
While Princes mortgaged their lands and principalities, in order to obtain a sum of money, they acted upon the principles of private credit. This was the case in the more early times, before government acquired that solidity which is necessary to establish a firm confidence. In proportion as it drew toward a regular system, the dawn of credit put on appearances analogous to the solidity of the fund upon which it was established.
The second step was to raise money upon a branch of taxes assigned to the lender, for the reimbursement of his capital and interest. We shall shew the consequences of this plan of credit from some examples, which will fully point out all its inconveniences.
This plan of administration was attended with so much abuse, and so much oppression, that statesmen began to despair of carrying on public affairs by such expedients; and therefore concluded that the only way to obtain money at the least expence, was to raise it on the subject within the year, or upon what they called short funds.
I take it for granted, that every tax, about that time, was imposed for a particular purpose, and assigned either to creditors, or to people who advanced money upon it: because we are told that the first imposition granted by the states to a King of France as a permanent branch of revenue, was an excise upon spirituous liquors granted to Philip de Valois, in the year 1345; at which time, however, according to Mr d'Eon's Memoires pour servir a l'Histoire generale des Finances, there were not less than twenty two different taxes known in France, which he enumerates as follows:
Davenant, like other great men of his time, was of opinion that borrowing money upon what he calls short funds, was much preferable to that upon perpetual interest; and he thought the most adviseable plan of all, could it be accomplished, was to raise the money wanted within the year.
Government was in constant war with creditors: when ready money failed in England, it had nothing to pay with but exchequer tallies, upon the taxes imposed. these were much more easily issued than acquitted. When the first year's amount of a tax was engaged, people considered the security for what was to follow as very precarious; consequently, the value of it diminished. 041b061a72